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ABSTRACT
In Masiya v DPP the Constitutional Court missed the opportunity to 
address the patently inadequate and unjust common law defi nition of the 
crime of rape. The Court had an opportunity to embrace its mandate as 
guardian of constitutional rights and, in adopting a conservative stance 
towards the development of the common law, failed to do so. Two points 
of particular interest that arise from the judgment are considered in this 
article: the Court’s unwillingness to extend the defi nition of rape along 
gender-neutral lines; and the impact of the principle of legality on the 
Courts’ ability to develop the common law defi nitions of crimes. There is 
no reason in logic or justice for why the defi nition of rape should be gen-
der-specifi c. Furthermore, in line with the minority judgment in Masiya, 
there is no rule of law that prohibits the Court from executing such an 
extension.
Introduction
‘The new constitution … accords to lawyers an expanded fi eld for real fulfi l-
ment in areas previously excluded by the sterility of the doctrine of parlia-
mentary sovereignty; and it equips them and the courts with teeth which are 
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sharp and biting enough to snarl at and chew on visible manifestations of 
injustice — whether it emanate from within or outside the agencies of the 
State’.1
This article contends that the Constitutional Court in Masiya v DPP2 
missed the opportunity described in the quote above to gnash its sharp 
teeth at a visible manifestation of injustice — the patently inadequate 
and unjust common law defi nition of the crime of rape. The Court had 
an opportunity to embrace its mandate as guardian of constitutional 
rights and, in adopting a conservative stance towards the development 
of the common law, failed to do so. In a separation of powers that is 
constructed as a vibrant constitutional dialogue, the Court’s contribut-
ing voice was meek indeed.
Two points of particular interest that arise from the judgment are 
considered in this article. The fi rst is the Court’s unwillingness to 
extend the defi nition of rape along gender-neutral lines. In reaching 
this decision the Court pronounced that the common-law defi nition of 
rape was not unconstitutional but merely fell short of s 39(2) of the 
Constitution’s directive that law should promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.3 This is criticised on two grounds: that it is 
tenuous reasoning to fi nd law in conformity with the Constitution and 
yet not fulfi lling the standard set in s 39(2); and that the retention of 
a gendered defi nition of rape is not in conformity with other common 
law crimes, nor with the reality of sexual violence nor with previous 
decisions of the same court. Development of the common law should 
be incremental but not at the expense of fully realising the spirit and 
protections of the Constitution. In our adoption of the principle of con-
stitutional supremacy it is precisely the Constitutional Court that has 
the mandate to ensure that the vision of the framers of the Constitution 
is fully realised.
The second point of interest explored is the impact of the principle of 
legality on the courts’ ability to develop the common law defi nitions of 
crimes. This article provides an alternative dialogue both to the Court’s 
apparently implicit acceptance of this ability and of certain commentators’ 
denial of the ability of the courts to so develop the law. It is argued that
1 Address by Chief Justice Ismail Mahomed to the Johannesburg Bar on his appoint-
ment, 25 June 1997.
2 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC).
3 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, hereinafter referred to as 
‘the Constitution’. Section 39(2) reads: ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’
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if the courts cannot develop the common-law defi nitions of crimes, 
the common law will eventually be relegated to the annals of history. 
Further, that the distinction drawn in the past between innovation and 
interpretation is artifi cial. Finally, even if the former argument is not 
supported, we argue that the Court would not fall foul of legality in 
developing the defi nition of rape along gender-neutral lines.
In order to understand the above issues it is necessary to provide a 
brief summary of the facts and fi ndings in the case.
The Courts’ approach in this judgment
Decision in the lower courts
The applicant, Mr Masiya, had been convicted in the Regional Court at 
Sabie for the rape of a 9-year-old girl. He had unlawfully and intention-
ally penetrated the girl anally without her consent. The conviction was 
referred to the High Court in terms of s 52 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 for purposes of sentence. Ranchod J, presiding over 
the matter, confi rmed the Magistrate’s fi nding that the common-law 
defi nition of rape was unconstitutional and required development in 
terms of s 39(2) of the Constitution.4 As part of the court’s order, the 
common-law defi nition of rape was redefi ned in gender neutral terms5 
and sentencing of the applicant was postponed pending confi rmation 
of the High Court order by the Constitutional Court. As a consequence 
of the gender-neutral defi nition of rape, the High Court was obliged to 
amend a number of provisions of the minimum sentencing legislation6 
so that it would no longer refer to women and girls only but also to 
men and boys. It was for this reason that the matter was referred to 
the Constitutional Court for confi rmation in terms of s 172(2)(a) of the 
Constitution.
The Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court declined to confi rm the High Court order. The 
majority, in a judgment written by Nkabinde J,7 found that the common-
4 S v Masiya 2006 (2) SACR 357 (T); S v Masiya 2006 (11) BCLR 1377.
5 Masiya supra (n2) 35 at para 2. The High Court redefi ned the common law defi ni-
tion of rape to include ‘acts of non-consensual sexual penetration of the male penis 
into the vagina or anus of another person’. Prior to this the common law defi nition of 
rape was ‘the unlawful and intentional sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
consent’.
6 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.
7 With whom Moseneke DCJ, Kondile AJ, Madala J, Mokgoro J, O’Regan J, Van der Wes-
thuizen J, Yacoob J and Van Heerden AJ concurred. 
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law defi nition of rape was not unconstitutional insofar as it criminalised 
conduct that was clearly morally and socially unacceptable.8 The defi ni-
tion did, however, need to be appropriately adapted as it was found to 
fall short of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.9 The 
common-law defi nition of rape was thus developed incrementally to 
include ‘acts of non-consensual penetration of a penis into the anus of a 
female’.10 The dissenting judgment, written by Langa CJ,11 found that it 
was not necessary to comment on the majority’s fi nding on the constitu-
tionality of the common-law defi nition of rape. This judgment found that 
it is possible to extend the defi nition to include the anal penetration of 
men as ordered by the High Court without specifi cally dealing with the 
constitutionality of the common-law defi nition.
Gender neutrality
Spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights
Men have long been marginalised in the context of sexual violence, 
their experiences of humiliation and sexual violation diminished on the 
grounds that the violation does not constitute rape but rather indecent 
assault. The implication of this is that it is a lesser personal violation. The 
majority in Masiya deny this claim categorically12 and the case, although 
pertaining to a young girl, was argued largely on the basis of gender-
neutrality. The amicus brought to the Court’s attention the prevalence of 
indecent assault against both boys and girls and argued that the defi ni-
tion of rape should be extended in a gender-neutral way.13
The decision by the majority to nonetheless develop the common-
law defi nition on a gendered basis has created a patently unjust and 
discriminatory circumstance between the sexes. Young boys (and men) 
can only be indecently assaulted, while young girls (and women) can 
8 Masiya supra (n2) 45 at para 27.
9 Ibid.
10 Masiya supra (n2) 60 at para 74. Note, the merits of the applicant’s conviction and the 
power of the magistrates’ court to develop the common law in respect of crimes were 
considered by the Court but fall outside the ambit of the discussion in this article.
11 With whom Sachs J concurred.
12 Masiya supra (n2) 46 at para 30 where the Court stated:
   ‘It can hardly be said that non-consensual anal penetration of males is less degrad-
ing, humiliating and traumatic… . That this is so does not mean that it is uncon-
stitutional to have a defi nition of rape which is gender-specifi c. Focusing on anal 
penetration of females should not be seen as being disrespectful to male bodily 
integrity or insensitive to the trauma suffered by male victims of anal violation, 
especially boys of the age of the complainant in this case.’
13 Written submissions on behalf of the amicus curiae in the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa paras 43-51 available at, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archim-
ages/8401 PDF accessed on, 15 October 2007.
344 SACJ . (2007) 3
       
be raped when penetrated anally. This is manifestly at odds with the 
principles and values contained in the Bill of Rights. On an interpreta-
tion of s 39(2) alone, or read together with the human rights contained 
in ss 9,14 1015 and 1216, a wider development is not only legally pos-
sible but confers a broader constitutional obligation on the members of 
the Court. Section 39(2) states that ‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, 
and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights.’ The Court, in developing the defi nition of rape along 
gendered lines, failed to fulfi l this obligation.
The majority states that the common-law defi nition of rape is consti-
tutional. Nkabinde J makes the following observation:
‘The current defi nition of rape criminalises unacceptable social conduct that 
is in violation of constitutional rights… . Invalidating the defi nition because 
it is under-inclusive is to throw the baby out with the bath water. What is 
required then is for the defi nition to be extended instead of being eliminated 
so as to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’17
She then continues to point out that s 39(2) ‘provides a paramount sub-
stantive consideration relevant to determining whether the common 
law requires development in any particular case’18 before concluding 
that ‘the defi nition is not inconsistent with the Constitution but needs 
to be adapted appropriately’.19 This reasoning is peculiar: how can law 
fall short of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, and 
yet not be seen as unconstitutional. The obligation to develop the law 
along these lines is not just as a mission statement — it is a provision 
in the Constitution and needs to be adhered to like any other clause.
Finding that, despite falling short of the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights, the law is nevertheless constitutional, fails to ac-
knowledge that the law is sending out a clearly discriminatory message 
to males. Young boys who are one of the most vulnerable groups in 
society require especially rigorous protection by the State. It fails also 
to protect them equally. Indecent assault is considered to be a lesser 
offence and offenders usually receive more lenient sentences and are 
sent back into society to re-offend. What is the message the Court is 
14 Section 9(1) states ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal pro-
tection and benefi t of the law.’
15 Section 10 states ‘[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected.’
16 Section 12(1)(c) states ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom and security of the person, 
which includes the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or 
private sources’
17 Masiya supra (n2) 45 at para 27.
18 Masiya supra (n2) 47 at para 31.
19 Masiya supra (n2) 47 at para 32.
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sending to our children? That if you are a female child you are more 
worthy of protection and more capable of being violated than a male 
child? The distinction is illogical and offensive. The only way to truly 
embrace the spirit, purport and objects of the protections contained in 
the Bill of Rights is to adopt the stance taken by the minority judgment. 
Langa CJ eloquently explains the obligation of the Court to order on 
gender-neutral terms:
‘…I fi nd that the inescapable conclusion of these imperatives is that the 
anal penetration of a male should be treated in the same manner as that of 
a female … [T]o do otherwise fails to give full effect to the constitutional 
values of dignity, equality and freedom: dignity through recognition of a 
violation; equality through equal recognition of that violation; and freedom 
as rape negates not only dignity but bodily autonomy. All these concerns 
apply equally to men and women and necessitate a defi nition that is gender-
neutral concerning victims’.20
It is shameful that the very guardians of the Constitution failed to offer 
vulnerable members of our society such recognition and protection. It 
is true that as a principle of law courts should be, and are, confi ned to 
the facts of the case before them when reaching judgment. This was 
the justifi cation provided by the majority in Masiya for refusing to 
develop the defi nition along gender-neutral lines:
‘The facts of the present case deal with penetration of the anus of a young 
girl… . The facts do not require us to consider whether or not the defi nition 
should be extended to include non-consensual penetration of the male anus 
by a penis … [I]t is not desirable that a case should be dealt with on the basis 
of what the facts might be rather than what they are’.21
However, adherence to this rule, or any rule for that matter, should not 
be observed at the expense of adhering to the principles contained in 
the Constitution. If, in order to produce an order that does not unfairly 
discriminate22 against vulnerable groups the Constitutional Court is 
forced to extend the reach of its judgment beyond the immediate facts 
20 Masiya supra (n2) 6 at para 80.
21 Masiya supra (n2) 46 at para 29.
22 In Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at para 31 the Court considered 
what constitutes ‘unfair discrimination’:
    ‘Given the history of this country we are of the view that “discrimination” has 
acquired a particular pejorative meaning relating to the unequal treatment of peo-
ple based on attributes and characteristics attaching to them. We are emerging from 
a period in our history which humanity of the majority of the inhabitants of this 
country was denied. They were treated as not having inherent worth: as objects 
whose identities could be arbitrarily defi ned by those in power rather than as 
persons of infi nite worth. In short they were denied recognition of their inherent 
dignity… In our law unfair discrimination… principally means treating persons 
differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings 
who are inherently equal in dignity.’ (emphasis added)
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before it, then it is the only court in the land that has the clear mandate 
to do so. Not only may it do so, arguably it must so do, or risk falling 
short of the obligation in s 39(2).
Refusing to do so, as it has in Masiya, has serious implications 
for access to justice. Challenging the law is a lengthy and expensive 
process. To place the onus of bringing the law in line with the Constitu-
tion on individual future applicants or interest groups is both unjust 
and unnecessarily laborious. The Court had a valid opportunity to 
mend the notoriously inadequate defi nition of rape — relying both 
on its constitutional mandate for adjudication and the specifi c injunc-
tion to develop the common law in line with the Constitution — and 
lamentably failed to seize it. Instead it created a legal inconsistency 
that, pending the legislature’s intervention, begs for another applicant 
to incur the costs and trauma of bringing their matter before the Court 
in order to remedy the gap in our criminal law.
A coherent approach
Another reason why the gender-specifi city of the current judgment is 
undesirable is that it is an anomaly in the common law — all violent 
criminal offences are crafted in gender-neutral terms except for the 
crime of rape.23 The Constitutional Court focused much of its discus-
sion on the recognition that the crime of rape is not one based on 
‘devaluing’ the virgin or on the prohibition of unchaste behaviour.24 
Rather it is based on imposing brute force and having power over 
another human being, regardless of their sex. If the Court is com-
mitted to accepting that the historical origins of the crime of rape 
are no longer accepted in modern society and that it is, like many 
criminal offences, about violence and domination, then there can be 
no reason for the Court to endorse a gender-specifi c defi nition of 
the crime.
This is particularly so in the case of the sexual assault of prepubes-
cent children, since their sexual organs are not yet developed, a fact 
which further substantiates the argument that the primary motivation 
of the crime is domination, control and power rather than sexual lust.25 
Sexual offences against children are rampant and are perpetrated against
23 The common-law crime of abortion might be another example, but there are obvious 
physiological reasons for such a gendered defi nition of the crime.
24 Masiya supra (n2) 43 at paras 20-3.
25 Written submissions on behalf of the amicus curiae in the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa op cit (n13) paras 40-1.
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both boys and girls.26 If South Africa is truly committed to protecting 
children, arguably the most vulnerable members of society, then more 
assertive intervention by our courts is required. The Constitutional 
Court had the opportunity to lead by example and send out a clear 
message that this society will not accept sexual violence against chil-
dren, all of whom are equally precious, and it disappointingly failed to 
seize it. Limiting the relief as it did further entrenched an unacceptable 
dichotomy, and discrimination, between males and females who have 
been anally penetrated without their consent. The Court acknowledges 
the violation that has occurred to the human rights of male victims as 
a result of the crime,27 but then sends the message that the violation 
is not so great as to warrant a robust approach to the development of 
the common law.
The approach in the judgment would seem to be that it is the legis-
lature’s role to remove the gender specifi city.28 However, the gender-
specifi c manner in which the law has been developed in Masiya is 
not consonant with other decisions of the Constitutional Court, most 
notably the ‘gay rights’ cases. Both of the National Coalition cases29 
as well as Gory30 and Fourie31 are examples where the Court ordered 
a gender-neutral remedy. These cases were brought before the Court 
on application by either a homosexual or lesbian couple who sought 
protection of their rights as well as of those of the opposite sex who 
26 Newspaper reports indicted that ‘Police statistics show that more than 22 000 chil-
dren were raped in the 2004-’05 fi nancial year’ and that ‘children are the victims of 
almost 50 percent of all rapes and attempted rapes in the country, while just under 
20 percent of all reported rapes are of children under the age of 11’. See Rauben-
heimer ‘Shock child-rape stats revealed’ Beeld Newspaper 17 May 2006, available at 
http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1934756,00.html, 
accessed on 14 October 2007 and; Peters ‘The rape shame — no light at the end of the 
tunnel’ IOL Daily News 15 September 2006, available at http://www.iol.co.za/index.
php?set_id=1&click_id=125&art_id=vn20060915095502185C486450, accessed on 
14 October 2007.
27 Masiya supra (n2) 46 at para 30.
28 Masiya supra (n2) 47 at para 30.
29 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 
(CC) in which the Court was required to make a fi nding on the constitutionality of 
the common-law crime of sodomy. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal-
ity v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) the Court was asked to declare s 25 
of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 unconstitutional on the grounds that it unfairly 
discriminated against same-sex couples.
30 Gory v Kolver NO 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) in which the applicant applied for confi rma-
tion of the High Court order fi nding s 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 
unconstitutional.
31 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie: Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). The Court was required to adjudicate on the 
constitutionality of the common law defi nition of marriage and, to the extent that it 
was impacted, on the constitutionality of the defi nition of marriage as found in the 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961.
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are in a similar position to themselves. The Court in every case granted 
relief as sought (with variations where statutory provisions were im-
plicated) and did not limit the relief based on the sex of the particular 
parties before it, be they a lesbian or homosexual couple. These cases 
were all incremental in their development, not because the relief was 
tailored to the sex of the parties before it, but because it was tailored to 
the offensive common law (or statutory) provision at issue. This would 
have been the appropriate way forward for the Court in Masiya.
Principle of legality
The Court’s inadequate approach to gender-neutrality in Masiya is 
also evident in its’ handling of the principle of legality. The focus of 
the judgment is clearly on the manner in which the principle impacts 
the applicant’s conviction, especially the prohibition on retrospective 
application of the law, with little discussion of any depth on whether 
the principle permits the development of the common law defi nition 
of crimes at all.32 It clearly doesn’t view this aspect of the principle as 
problematic or worthy of detailed attention, as it did indeed develop 
the common law defi nition of rape to include the anal penetration of 
females. Inherent in this decision must be an acknowledgment that 
such development does not constitute an infringement of legality, 
though substantiation was not provided.
Regarding retroactivity, the Court rightly avoids falling foul of this 
aspect of the principle of legality in deciding not to apply their extension 
of the defi nition of rape to the applicant. In reaching this decision the 
Court correctly, in our view, distinguished the European Courts’ decision 
in SW v United Kingdom; CR v United Kingdom,33 in that the legisla-
tion establishing criminal liability for marital rape had been at a more 
developed stage than that of the Sexual Offences Bill34 and the public 
were more aware of the change in the law.35 But this foreign precedent 
can be distinguished on other grounds too. Ashworth and Emmerson 
have criticised SW ‘on the ground that the court sacrifi ced an important 
constitutional principle in order to achieve a socially desirable result in 
the individual case’ (emphasis added).36 In Masiya, however, developing 
the common law to its full logical conclusion would have produced a 
constitutionally and socially desirable result. Following the Court’s logic, 
32 See the principles of legality as outlined by Professor J Burchell below.
33 SW v United Kingdom; CR v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 363.
34 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Bill (B 50-2003). 
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Sexual Offences Bill’ or ‘the Bill’.
35 Masiya supra (n2) at para 56.
36 B Emmerson and A Ashworth Human Rights and Criminal Justice (2001) 10-29, cited 
in Hoctor, ‘Recent cases: Specifi c crimes’ (2007) 1 SACJ 78 at 85.
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such development would not have fallen foul of the principle of legality 
as, unlike in the case of SW, the extension would not have been applied 
to the applicant himself. In the light of this, the Court’s failure to extend 
the defi nition on gender-neutral lines is anomalous.
Despite the Court’s apparent acceptance of their ability to develop the 
common law defi nition of crimes, not all commentators recognise this 
power as falling within the limits of the principle of legality. For example, 
in a recent case review Hoctor provided a well-reasoned consideration of 
the principle of legality in order to motivate that the Constitutional Court 
should not uphold the decisions of the two lower courts in Masiya.37 
According to this line of reasoning, to develop the defi nition of rape 
along gender-neutral lines, or any lines, would fall foul of the principle 
of legality and the separation of powers.38
What follows is an alternative conception of the principle of legality 
to that proffered by the above reasoning. It is argued that there are 
sound reasons why the principle should not have been an obstacle to 
developing the defi nition of rape along gender-neutral lines, which the 
Court unfortunately did not explicitly address.
Theft — is the legality principle different under our new 
constitutional regime?
Extending the ambit of the crime of theft to include theft of credit39 has 
been cited as an example of the courts’ historical development of the 
37 Hoctor op cit (n36).
38 See for example Hoctor op cit (n36) at 86:
   ‘…[I]t should be recognised that there is a crucial difference between the legitimate 
and vital role of the courts in striking down criminal law rules which are unconsti-
tutional and the act of extending the bounds of existing crimes, which founders on 
the principle of legality. Notwithstanding the diffi culties associated with the slow 
passage of the Sexual Offences Bill into law and the problems with the common 
law defi nition of the crime of rape, it remains unacceptable that a court should dis-
regard the principle of legality in usurping the function of the legislature’.
39 See for example R v Milne and Erleigh (7) 1951 (1) SA 791 (A) E at 865:
   ‘Where, therefore, a person takes another’s money without authority to do so and 
intending to consume it … he commits theft, even if he intends to return other 
money, if it is proved that he did not, when he took it, believe that he had the right 
to take it or that the owner, had he been consulted, would have consented to the 
taking’.
 See also R v Solomon 1953 (4) SA 518 (AD) at 522: ‘It must be borne in mind that, 
under our modern system of banking and paying by cheque or kindred process, the 
question of ownership in specifi c coins no longer arises in cases where resort to that 
system is made’ and; R v Herholdt 1957 (3) SA 236 (A). Reference is made to these 
decisions in S v Graham 1975 (3) SA 569 (A) at 577:
   ‘The foregoing decisions have not escaped academic criticism, but they stand as 
judgments of this Court. They were referred to in the arguments in the instant case 
without criticism and I need say no more than that I am unpersuaded that they are 
manifestly wrong. They are therefore binding.’
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defi nitions of common-law crimes.40 This example has however been 
distinguished from Masiya on the basis that this particular develop-
ment occurred ‘some thirty years prior to the coming into force of the 
Bill of Rights, and today such an extension would fl y in the face of 
the incorporation of the principle of legality in the Constitution’.41 It 
is unclear exactly what is meant by this statement. Does it mean that 
the principle of legality, as incorporated in the Constitution, is differ-
ent from that under common law, which pre-dated the constitutional 
variety? Or does it mean that the principle of legality is the same as it 
has always been but since it is now incorporated in the Constitution it 
holds more weight, so that prior to its inclusion in the Constitution it 
was understandable that the courts disregarded it in the context of the 
common law crime of theft?
It is contended that both of these interpretations is incorrect. As 
Hoctor states, ‘the principle of legality is at the core of the rule of law 
doctrine’.42 As such it was a fundamental and binding principle of law 
before the Constitution and it remains so after it. It is further disputed 
that the principle of legality as contained in the Constitution is differ-
ent from the pre-Constitution principle.
The principle of legality is defi ned similarly by both Professors 
Burchell43 and Snyman.44 The cardinal common-law aspects to the 
principle are these:
1. crimes and their punishments must be created by a properly made 
law explicitly identifying the conduct as a crime;
2. there must be some punishment affi xed to the commission of the 
act;
3. the defi nition of the common law and statutory crimes should be 
reasonably precise and settled;
4. penal statutes should be strictly construed;
5. the law should be accessible;
6. the punishment for offences must be prescribed by law; and
7. criminal laws must have a prospective operation, in other words 
there can be no punishment imposed retrospectively.45
The above items can be contrasted with the constitutional protection 
of the legality principle contained in s 35(3)(l) of the Constitution. It 
states that:
40 Hoctor op cit (n36) 81.
41 Ibid.
42 Hoctor op cit (n36) 79.
43 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law Revised 3ed (2006) 96.
44 CR Snyman Criminal Law 4ed (2002) 39.
45 Burchell op cit (n43) 96-104. 
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‘[e]very accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the 
right not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence 
under either national or international law at the time it was committed 
or omitted’.46
So what is the impact, if any, of the different expression of the princi-
ple of legality as found in the Constitution as against its expression in 
common law? The inclusion of the principle in the Constitution should 
be seen as a re-statement of the prominence of the principle in the rule 
of law, and as requiring an infusion of the ethos of the Bill of Rights 
into the interpretation of the principle of legality. It encapsulates all of 
the common law elements of the principle without needing to specifi -
cally restate each element:
‘The principle of legality is the juristic kernel of the Rule of Law in the con-
text of the criminal law. The founding provisions of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, refer to the ‘rule of law’ and so any aspects 
of the principle of legality not specifi cally referred to in the Constitution 
could be read into the Constitution by an interpretation of the ambit of the 
Rule of Law’.47
The fact that the entire ambit of the principle is not explicitly included 
in the Constitution should not be read as altering its formation. The 
Constitution includes the skeleton of the principle which the courts 
should then understand in the light of the years of jurisprudence which 
fl esh it out.
If this is so, then how is one to understand the court’s development 
of the ambit of the crime of theft? Did the court err and fall foul of the 
principle of legality? No such challenge has been launched and the 
common law defi nition of theft in its developed form today includes
46 Other Constitutional references to the principle of legality are contained in s 1(c) 
which states
   ‘The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values: Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.’
 Section 35(3)(m) and (n) enshrine the following aspects of the principle:
  ‘Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right—
  (m)  not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that 
person has previously been either acquitted or convicted;
  (n)    to the benefi t of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the pre-
scribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the time that 
the offence was committed and the time of sentencing.’
47 Burchell op cit (n43) 106. See also Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at paras 58-9 in relation to 
the Interim Constitution. 
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the theft of credit.48 The court, in so developing the common law, did 
not fall foul of the principle of legality and performed its designated 
role. The very nature of the common law is that it develops over time as 
society develops and as the courts’ understanding of certain concepts 
or laws develop. The law, along with society in general, progresses and 
changes over time. If the courts were not able to develop the common 
law, in line with the principle of legality, as society develops, the 
common law would become defunct and would eventually be replaced 
by more relevant legislation. The boundary between common law and 
civil law systems would be increasingly blurred.
Interpretation vs innovation
The preceding discussion of legality encompasses a robust approach 
to the relationship between the development of the common law and 
the principle of legality. Such an approach requires recognising that 
while the courts have drawn a distinction between ‘legitimate inter-
pretation and innovation’,49 interpretation is not necessarily devoid 
of, nor distinct from, innovation. In order to ensure the meaningful 
survival of our common law the courts will need to be innovative in 
their interpretations of the defi nitions of crimes so that they remain 
relevant in modern society. As such, additional components of crimes 
that have not previously been recognised by the courts may now have 
to be in order to ensure the law’s relevance — for example that theft 
of credit may indeed be a component of the defi nition of the crime of 
theft despite the fact that it had not previously been recognised. In this 
way the common law grows within the existing framework of crimes
48 See as a recent example of the courts recognition of theft including theft of incor-
poreals, S v Boesak 2000 (3) SA 381 (SCA) 404 at paras 96-8. The court has not 
always been willing to embrace, or even recognise, its ability to develop the ambit 
of common-law crimes. See for example, Ex Parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v J; S 
v Von Molendorff 1989 (4) SA 1028 (A) at 1042 where the court refused to recognise 
non-patrimonial benefi t within the common law crime of extortion: ‘Indien daar ‘n 
behoefte in die samelewing is dat afpersing uitgebrei behoort te word, dan is dit ‘n 
beleidsaspek vir die Wetgewer om te oorweeg’ and; S v Mintoor 1996 (1) SACR 514 
(C) at 517 where the court refused to recognise theft of electricity as part of the 
common law crime of theft: ‘In die algemeen gesproke, is dit in elk geval juridies 
ongesond om die trefwydte van ons strafreg deur Hofbeslissings te vergroot. Die uit-
bouing van strafregtelike sanksies is ‘n taak wat normaalweg aan die Wetgewer oor-
gelaat word om te verrig indien en insoverre hy dit nodig ag’. The courts’ reluctance 
to so develop the law in these instances does not recognise earlier decisions, such as 
those referred to in (n39) above, emanating from the Appellate Division. This reluc-
tance to so engage with the common law is thus unfounded.
49 Hoctor op cit (n36). See also Masiya supra (n2) 55 at para 52 in which the Court 
seems to recognise the distinction between clarifi cation of the common law and the 
creation of new common-law offences.
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it recognises, thus adhering to the principle of legality by not creat-
ing new categories of, or labels for, common law crimes. If behaviour 
cannot be legitimately fi tted into an existing common law defi nition 
and requires a new label altogether, then it is, and should be, wholly 
up to the legislature to intervene.
Furthermore, such an approach to the principle of legality and the 
development of the common law does not fall foul of the separation of 
powers, as the legislature is always free to intervene should they fi nd 
that the court erred in its interpretation of the common law crimes. Far 
from breaching the separation of powers, such a division of labour is 
utterly consonant with the conception of the separation of powers in 
South Africa, which is conceived of as a constitutional dialogue50 with 
each arm of the State given checking functions over the others. This is 
a collaborative and co-operative model that ensures the smooth func-
tioning and legitimacy of the operations of the State. The Constitution 
explicitly requires such co-operation between the three arms of State 
to facilitate the ideals of the Constitution.51
‘The doctrine of the separation of powers, while suggesting good reasons 
why…lines must be drawn (judicial non-accountability, institutional com-
petence, etc), does not of itself indicate precisely where they should be 
placed’.52
Simply stating that law-making is the preserve of the legislature does 
not mean that the judiciary should not, nor never does, involve itself in 
the development of law.
‘The principle of the separation of powers… recognises the functional inde-
pendence of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of 
checks and balances… anticipates the… unavoidable intrusion of one branch 
on the terrain of another. No constitutional scheme can refl ect a complete 
separation of powers: the scheme is always one of partial separation.’53
50 See Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1999) at 41-8: ‘A different 
conception (of the separation of powers) is needed which emphasises the need to 
develop a culture of openness, responsiveness and justifi cation in the interchange 
between the different branches of government.’
51 Section 41(1)(h) of the Constitution states:
   ‘All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must co-oper-
ate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by—
  (i) fostering friendly relations;
  (ii) assisting and supporting one another;
  (iii)  informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common 
interest;
  (iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another;
  (v) adhering to agreed procedures; and
  (vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another.’
52 Chaskalson op cit (n50) 41-9, 41-10.
53 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certifi cation of the Consti-
tution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para 109.
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For example, policy and budget are traditionally the preserve of the 
executive, but adjudicating on socio-economic rights has implications 
for both.54 Furthermore, the mere fact that a right has social policy 
implications has not precluded judicial intervention in other spheres. 
Issues such as the constitutionality of the death penalty and the right 
to equality have implications for a range of social programmes, yet 
the Court’s pronouncement on these issues has not led to allegations 
of a breach of the separation of powers — nor should its develop-
ment of the common law, when done within the parameters of the 
principle of legality.
Constitutional development of the common law
It is clear that commentators may take a more conservative approach 
when it comes to legality and developing the common law.55 Though 
this article would disagree with such a stance, even on this conserva-
tive approach it is possible to distinguish Masiya and argue that the 
Court should have developed the law to its logical conclusion, being 
gender neutral in that case. In this respect it is important to distin-
guish between expanding the common law and bringing it in line with 
the Constitution. If courts cannot do the latter then the constitutional 
injunction for the courts to develop the common law in line with 
the Constitution56 is rendered meaningless.57 Our Constitution was 
intended as a document with teeth, capable of instituting real change 
in people’s lives and in their position before the law. To pay only lip 
service to this injunction would be contrary to the spirit and purport 
of the Constitution. It is trite to say that caution should be exercised in 
so developing the common law and that appropriate deference should 
be paid to the other arms of State. However, when the legislature has 
dragged its feet to the point of negligence, as was the case with the 
Sexual Offences Bill, it is both necessary and desirable that the Courts 
intervene. In so doing they are both fulfi lling their checking function 
towards the legislature58 and fulfi lling their obligation to ensure the 
law is consistent with the Constitution.
54 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); Minis-
ter of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
55 Hoctor op cit (n36) at 86.
56 Section 39(2) of the Constitution.
57 This is recognised by the majority in Masiya supra (n2) 53 at para 51.
58 See the powers of the Constitutional Court in s 167(5) of the Constitution:
   ‘The Constitutional Court makes the fi nal decision whether an Act of Parliament, a 
provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, and must confi rm any 
order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court 
of similar status, before that order has any force.’
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A further distinction can be drawn between developing the common 
law because the current defi nition is felt to be unacceptable on moral 
grounds, and developing the common law to be in line with the Con-
stitution. Here the following quote from Marais J’s judgment in S v 
Augustine59 is illuminating:
‘There are always people to be found who invite and favour “extensions” 
by the Court of the existing principles of the common law to encompass 
situations which they feel “should” be encompassed, even if they have not 
hitherto been so encompassed. I do not think the Courts should respond too 
readily to such invitations. Fundamental innovations of this kind are for the 
Legislature…and not the Courts.’
The type of scenario described above is not one that includes the sce-
nario involved in Masiya. Yes, most right thinking people believe that 
the defi nition of rape should be developed and that it is both morally 
unacceptable and socially inappropriate in terms of encompassing and 
refl ecting rape survivors’ experience. But that is not the point judicially. 
The point is rather — with due respect to the fi nding of the majority to 
the contrary — that the common law defi nition of rape is unconstitu-
tional. This is so both because it fails to meet the standard set in s 39(2) 
and because, to reiterate the fi nding of Langa CJ, it
‘fails to give full effect to the constitutional values of dignity, equality and 
freedom: dignity through recognition of a violation; equality through equal 
recognition of that violation; and freedom as rape negates not only dignity but 
bodily autonomy. All these concerns apply equally to men and women…’60
That is suffi cient justifi cation for the Court to develop the common law 
(in line with the afore-mentioned constitutional injunction) without 
having to resort to justifi cations under the principle of legality. This is 
even more pronounced considering that the partial extension the Court 
permitted was, rightly, not applied retrospectively to Mr Masiya himself. 
The partial extension of the common-law defi nition of rape by the Con-
stitutional Court in Masiya is particularly lamentable. It has resulted in 
what must surely be considered the absurd and untenable situation of 
the Constitutional Court issuing an order that, according to the above 
line of reasoning, can itself be challenged for being unconstitutional. 
The revised defi nition of rape, which excludes men from being victims
59 S v Augustine 1986 (3) SA 294 (C) at 302-3. Note, this quote was relied on by Pro-
fessor Hoctor to motivate against the courts intervening in Masiya in Hoctor op cit 
(n36) 82.
60 Masiya supra (n2) 61 at para 80.
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of the crime, discriminates against some of the most vulnerable groups 
in society, such as young boys, homosexuals and prisoners.61
Conclusion — picking battles
It may well be that the majority of the Court adopted the position they 
did on the basis that the Sexual Offences Bill was tabled to be con-
sidered before Parliament. Indeed, no more than two weeks after the 
judgment was handed down, the legislature passed the Bill62 — which 
has subsequently been accepted by the NCOP. It is on the basis of 
this deferential dynamic between the judiciary and the legislature that 
support has been expressed for the non-intervention of the Court 
in Masiya.63 Presumably though, on this line of thinking, the Court 
should not have developed the defi nition at all — especially in light 
of the majority’s fi nding that the common-law defi nition of rape was 
not unconstitutional. This stance feels intuitive. Each branch of the 
State adheres clearly to its’ own mandate and as a result the smooth 
functioning of the State is bolstered. Nonetheless, it is argued that 
this was a disappointingly conservative stance for the Court to adopt 
towards the separation of powers and one that is not consonant with 
the Court’s previous approach.
The powers of the legislature and the courts arise from different 
constitutional provisions64 and these provisions impose a mandatory 
and separate obligation on these organs of government to perform 
their constitutional roles. The reality that these different processes may 
intersect is where the debate on the proper functions and roles of 
these organs begin. It must however be borne in mind that the proc-
esses run parallel to one another and although consideration must 
be given to what another organ of state is doing, the obligation and 
duty is foremost to the Constitution. Thus, even when respecting the 
separate functions of the legislature and the courts, the Court ought to 
have affected a complete development of the common law in a manner 
that resulted in an order that is harmonious with the rights contained 
in Chapter 2 and with the spirit of the Bill of Rights. Refusing to do so 
is failing to fulfi l its primary responsibility to uphold the Constitution.
61 The relevance of vulnerability in deciding whether discrimination is ‘unfair’ was 
clearly described by O’Regan J in President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 
1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para 112: ‘The more vulnerable the group adversely affected by 
the discrimination, the more likely it will be held to be unfair’.
62 Passed by Parliament on 28 May 2007.
63 Hoctor op cit (n36) 82.
64 The legislature derives their law-making power from ss 43, 44, 75 and 76 read with 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution; while the judiciary derives the power to inter-
pret and pronounce on the constitutional validity of laws from ss 8, 39, 167-73 of the 
Constitution.
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The majority interestingly cite Carmichele65 as precedent for the in-
cremental development of the common law. Yet Carmichele can in fact 
be seen to promote judicial activism. The case provided for an exten-
sion of state liability within the law of delict. The approach adopted 
by the Court with regard to state liability in this case fl ies in the face 
of conventional wisdom in similar jurisdictions, according to which 
allowing such delictual claims would open the fl oodgates. This would 
disable the state that in most instances functions well. However, the 
same cannot always be said of the South African state and the Court’s 
stance refl ects this. Decisions such as Carmichele ensure that pressure 
is put on government to be more accountable, not just for the actions 
of the police, but generally in the manner in which it performs its 
duties to the public. The Court stated that a new and different set of 
legal norms was brought into operation by the Constitution and that:
‘under section 39(2) of the Constitution concepts such as “policy decisions 
and value judgments” refl ecting the “wishes … and perceptions … of the 
people” and “society’s notions of what justice demands” might well have to 
be replaced or supplemented and enriched by the appropriate norms of the 
objective value system embodied in the Constitution’.66
In Masiya, much less is asked of the Court. Gender neutrality was 
raised in the papers of the amicus and to not provide this remedy 
has correctly been questioned by both the legal profession67 and civil 
society.68
Carmichele is not the only example of a judgment issued by the 
Court that can be seen as courageous. While Carmichele required the 
65 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).
66 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security supra (n65) at para 56. See also Du Ples-
sis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 CC at para 86:
   ‘the common law is not to be trapped within the limitations of its past… . It needs 
to be revisited and revitalised with the spirit of constitutional values defi ned in 
chapter 3 of the Constitution and with full regard to the purport and objects of that 
chapter.’
67 See for example De Vos ‘Male rape: What were the judges smoking?’ Constitu-
tionally Speaking 10 May 2007 available at, http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/
?p=247#comments accessed on, 15 October 2007:
   ‘This is … the “halfway pregnant” approach to legal reasoning. Really, even as a 
mere matter of logic the argument does not stand up to scrutiny. Either the present 
gender and orifi ce specifi c defi nition of rape fl ies in the face of the constitutional 
values like dignity, equality and bodily integrity and requires a development of the 
common law, or it does not (in which case no development would be required).’
68 See for example Adams ‘Court fi nds men can’t be raped’ The Mercury Newspaper 11 
May 2007 available at, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=
vn20070511033421378C502887 accessed on, 15 October 2007:
   ‘Joan van Niekerk, the Director of Childline, said it was a surprising conclusion for 
a court with the responsibility of upholding the principles of equality. She said the 
issue of male rape, particularly of children, remained “largely unaddressed” by the 
justice system.’
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Court to stand fi rm in the face of government sentiment, the Court has 
also found itself under pressure from the public. As the high crime rate 
persists, public anger about the Court’s perceived leniency towards 
criminals rises. Two examples of particularly contentious judgments in 
the eyes of the public include the decision to rule out the death penalty 
as unconstitutional69 and the decision to allow prisoners voting rights.70 
These decisions have led to accusations that the court is ‘radical’.71
This allegation is puzzling in light of several judgments in which one 
could accuse the court of pandering to public fear or prejudice. For 
example, in 1999 the court rejected a challenge to a piece of legislation 
that tightened the conditions under which awaiting trial prisoners can 
be awarded bail.72 It is widely contended that this law was enacted 
to placate the growing public rage at the perceived ease with which 
murderers and rapists obtain bail. The court justifi ed its decision not to 
interfere by explicitly referring to the high crime rate.73
The Court’s oscillation between ‘cautious’ and ‘radical’ rulings is not 
evidence of an identity crisis on its part, but shows that the Court 
is learning how to pick it battles. The court needs to be, and needs 
to appear to be, impartial, or it risks losing legitimacy in the eyes of 
either government or the public or both: ‘The court cannot stray too 
far from the mainstream for fear of losing it legitimacy. On the other 
hand, the court must defend the marginalised and vulnerable against 
the potential tyranny of any majority’.74 Judging from the diversity of 
applicants that make use of the Court and the fact that, though at times 
resentfully, government has agreed to abide by court orders against 
them,75 it appears that the Court has managed to establish and main-
tain its legitimacy: ‘That suggests that although the court might not be 
loved, it is trusted and respected’.76
Regarding Masiya, however, it is submitted that the Court missed 
the opportunity to pick a battle that urgently needed fi ghting. The 
legislature had failed its duty to the public by persistently failing to 
pass the Sexual Offences Bill. The Constitutional Court, in failing to 
develop the defi nition of rape adequately, failed to speak up in the 
constitutional dialogue that functions in South Africa between the 
69 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
70 Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-inte-
gration of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC).
71 P De Vos ‘Constitutional Court judges are far from radical’ Sunday Times Newspaper 
28 March 2004.
72 S v Dlamini 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) at 623.
73 S v Dlamini supra (n72) at para 2, footnote 6 and para 67.
74 De Vos op cit (n71).
75 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom supra (n54); Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign supra (n54).
76 De Vos op cit (n71).
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various arms of state. There is no reason in logic or justice for why the 
defi nition of rape should be gender-specifi c. Furthermore, in line with 
the minority judgment in Masiya, there is no rule of law that prohibits 
the Court from executing such an extension. On the contrary, creating 
a gender-neutral order would have enhanced the Court’s commitment 
to its obligation in s 39(2). The Court has the power to make any order 
that is just and equitable.77 The order issued seems however to illus-
trate Beresford’s gloomy view of the courts expressed in 2004: ‘…[O]ne 
is left scratching around for “watchdogs” of liberty… the judiciary has 
shown little sign of its being a bulwark of constitutional rights’.78
Hoctor79 reminds the reader of Burger J’s statement in S v Burger 
that ‘one must guard against disgust for the accused’s conduct and 
the desire that he be punished leading to the illegitimate extension 
of a legal principle’.80 But lamenting the Court’s fi nding in Masiya is 
not simply about disgust at the applicant’s conduct. The nature of his 
behaviour is equally reprehensible whether it has the label ‘rape’ or 
‘sexual assault’ attached to it. It seems absurd to argue that penetrat-
ing a nine-year old anally is less reprehensible if it is called indecent 
assault. The judgment is lamentable because the state of the law in 
this area is itself abhorrent. The law is reprehensible. The law is also 
unconstitutional and thus, in our constitutional supremacy, ripe for the 
Constitutional Court to develop. This development could have been 
affected with the intention of the legislature in mind as the Bill, on 
which the legislature so noticeably dragged its feet, was available for 
the Court to consult.
77 The Constitution contains both primary and secondary remedial clauses. The primary 
remedy clauses are a supremacy clause and a fundamental rights remedy clause. The 
supremacy clause (s 2) reads: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of The Republic; 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must 
be fulfi lled’. The fundamental rights remedy clause, s 38, is found in the Bill of Rights: 
‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleg-
ing that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court 
may grant appropriate relief…’ The secondary remedy clause in The Constitution is 
s 172(1):
   ‘When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court —
   (a)  must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution 
is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency; and
   (b)  may make any order that is just and equitable, including —
   (i)  an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; 
and
   (ii)      an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on 
any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect’.
78 Beresford ‘On South Africa’s long road to freedom’ The Guardian Newspaper 3 June 
2004. 
79 Hoctor op cit (n36) 86.
80 S v Burger 1975 (2) SA 601 (C) at 622H.
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